I. Introduction
S ince the middle of the 1970s it is generally held that protectionism has increased in general and particularly in the form of so-called voluntary export restraints (VERs) [see e.g. articles in Cline, 1985] . AVER is an export restriction imposed by an importing country typically for perceived employment reasons in the importing country. VERs are thus not "voluntary" in the normal sense of the word.
At present VERs affect developing countries' exports of clothing to Western Europe and North America, Japanese passenger car exports to France, Italy, and U.K., Japanese and European steel exports to the U.S., Asian exports of consumer electronics to several developed countries and, finally, a few agricultural commodities are affected like Thai exports of cassava to the EC.
A VER increases the domestic price and production volume in the importing country, it changes the trade pattern by stimulating trade diversion, and it transfers rents from importing to exporting countries. The VER distorts resource allocation and employment (e.g. by possibly creating a monopoly) and introduces the need for an export licence allocation mechanism. On these effects see Corden [1971, Chs. 9; 10], Cable [1981; 1985] , Hamilton [1981; 1985; 1986a; b] , Jenkins [1980] , Keesing, Wolf [1980] , Morkre [1979] , Murray et al. [1983] , Takacs [1978] and Wolf [1985] .
This paper examines from a theoretical point of view another aspect of VERs, viz. the "upgrading" effect, i.e. that with a VER goods exported tend to be more sophisticated compared to a situation without a VER. The objective of the paper is to deepen the understanding of the theoretical issues and mechanisms involved rather than providing straightforwardly policy advice or empirical evidence. Upgrading is often mentioned in descriptions of e.g. Voluntary Export Restraints VERs on clothing and passenger cars, but until recently it has proved difficult to establish empirically any upgrading effect. Unit import (or export) values, for instance, can increase over time for several reasons with a VER: firstly, there is the increase due to the export tax equivalent of a VER; secondly, there is a unit value increase due to inflation in each particular commodity group regardless of any trade restriction and, thirdly, unit value could rise due to upgrading.
Feenstra [1984] examined whether there was a quality change in Japanese cars exported to the U.S. after the 1980 VER was introduced. Feenstra managed to decompose the overall price increase in the (nominal) retail price of Japanese cars into three parts: increased scarcity due to reduced supply, inflation, and quality improvement. Correcting for the inflationary effect, "about two-thirds of the rise in import prices can be attributed to quality improvement". Feenstra's approach is based on a model of Rodriguez [1979] with a single import good and competitive firms choosing the optimal export product quality. A different approach was used by Falvey [1979] who considered two imported goods with different prices which by assumption reflected different qualities or "grades". In the present paper Falvey's approach is carried further. Our conclusions are given in the summary section at the end. The paper is inspired by Corden's [1976] neglected paper on nonuniformity of tariffs and customs union formation.
II. The Model
We consider a small home country which has one exportable and two importables and the latter two are substitutes for domestic production and consumption. The importables are assumed to be two varieties of a commodity and the government lumps the two varieties together into one commodity import category. For example, the import category could be shirts or cars with one high price variety and one low price variety. Denote the high price and the low price variety M H and ML, respectively.
Next, the government introduces a VER defined in physical units limiting the aggregate import supply of the two varieties and not distinguishing between them. Because the VER is defined in physical units, the tariff equivalent of the VER will be a rate per unit. Consequently, as the two varieties catch different prices the ad valorem tariff equivalent of the VER will be lower on M H than on ML, and the VER causes the domestic price of one of the importable varieties to increase more than that of the other. There is an upgrading effect or, more generally, an import pattern effect.
In order to concentrate on the import pattern effect we assume, (i) that the elasticity of supply of the exportable is zero, and (ii) that there is no domestic consumption of the exportable. Hence the quantity and value of exports and imports are immutably fixed.
We start with the free trade situation depicted in Figure 1 . The quantities
